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Origin and basis of submission 
 
The author, a sociologist working in a law school,1 researches and publishes on 
regulation of financial markets, with specific attention to the policy, regulatory and 
market conditions that propagate or mitigate crisis.2 The work is carried out within a 
broadly socio-legal perspective. The focus for this submission is determined by the 
Parliamentary Commission’s terms of reference (for external readers, these can be 
found on its website). The views expressed here do not represent those of the 
author’s university. 
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S.1. Basic assumptions 
 
 There is wide interest in connecting issues of (i) occupational culture, (ii) 
compliance/ misconduct, (iii) remuneration and (iv) clawback (the bonus/malus 
debate).  
 
 Individual-focussed measures (supervision, remuneration and measures in civil or 
criminal law) must be supplemented by a wider, whole-firm regulatory strategy.  
 
 Whilst attention has been drawn to ‘the tone at the top’, ‘the tone in the middle’ 
and ‘the tone at the bottom’ are as important. Collectively, mid- and lower-level 
staff see and know more than chief executives or boards. To reform culture, all 
levels need to be properly incentivised. 
 
 In cases of rule-breaking, recklessness or malfeasance, clawing back a proportion 
of past and/or present remuneration is a matter of economic justice. 
 
 However, questions about who to hold (co-)responsible and to target for 
recoveries need to be more imaginatively addressed than hitherto. Up to now, 
some of those working in the financial services industry have passively gained 
from the recklessness and misdemeanours of their peers – for example, through 
group bonuses – whilst not being at any risk of clawbacks unless they are also are 
flagrantly involved. All rewards for passive connivance should be withdrawn, 




 The Commission should recommend collective responsibility, financial 
accountability and clawbacks – applying laterally to co-workers of miscreants, as 
well as vertically to management. This would animate the occupational culture, 
incentivising all levels of banking staff, in a proactive and precautionary manner, to 
bring informal pressure to bear against reckless or improper practices and, where 
that fails, to trigger formal investigation, via reporting and whistleblowing. 
 
 A forthright approach would be to go for such linked cultural and remuneration 
reforms across the whole sector. A more tentative and exploratory step would be 
to use the (partly) publicly-owned banks as a testing ground. An alternative would 
be to require such reforms selectively, as conditions of settlement with regulators. 
If monitoring over time finds that the changes seem positive, then that could 
provide ammunition for wider change across the industry.  
 
S.3. Future work 
 
 Further thought needs to be given to the relationship between occupational culture 
within banking, and broader shifts of sentiment associated with the business cycle.     
 
 The relationship between (a) risk-taking and (b) the implicit public guarantees 
enjoyed by banks and liquidity support by central banks remains problematic. 
 
* * *
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Collective responsibility: why and how 
 
1. Introduction. In this submission, a proactive strategy is proposed, looking at what 
could be achieved through an inculcation of collective responsibility and how that 
might be achieved. Secondly this submission explores why action against 
individuals – including criminal prosecutions – must be regarded as inadequate in 
terms of the Commission’s terms of reference. This submission then turns to the 
question, raised during the deliberations of the Commission, about ‘talent’ and 
remuneration, addressing that question in the context of clawbacks. Finally, this 
submission opens up for discussion the question of whether and how occupational 
culture and collective responsibility might relate to the business cycle.   
 
2. Scope. Reform of the occupational culture of banking is commonly mentioned as 
being a potential means of reducing misconduct by bank executives and staff, 
including ‘rogue’ trading, frauds, mis-selling, insider trading and long-running and 
widespread market manipulation (e.g. Libor rate fixing).3 There is wide interest in 
connecting issues of (i) occupational culture, (ii) compliance/misconduct, (iii) 
remuneration and (iv) clawback (the bonus/malus debate). That interest in 
‘connecting the dots’ is articulated here.  
 
3. Approach. However, this submission does not follow the tradition of 
conceptualising governance in bifurcated terms, as (a) broadcasting to all staff 
some morally anodyne ‘tone from the top’ messages whilst, (b) occasionally and in 
a highly focused manner, applying forms of discipline such as clawbacks, 
sackings and/or criminal prosecution. Such bifurcated conceptions do not mark a 
break with the thinking and mechanisms that brought the industry to its current 
position. A better integration of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ is needed. 
 
4. Economic justice. Certainly, in cases of rule-breaking, recklessness or 
malfeasance, clawing back a proportion of past and/or present remuneration 
(deferred bonus, present salary, other benefits, whatever can be made available) 
is a matter of economic justice. Clawback does not preclude criminal prosecution. 
 
5. Targeting of clawbacks. However, the question of whom to target for recoveries 
needs to be more critically and imaginatively addressed than hitherto. There exists 
within bank management a notion that “only a handful of staff are usually to 
blame” (a few rotten apples).4 This is a self-serving line, because defining 
responsibility for scandals in terms of blame for a few individuals whitewashes 
those close by and above. It minimises the potential for clawbacks, because the 
pool for such recoveries is constructed as being small. Thus it ensures that the 
greatest proportion of the costs of misbehaviour and of regulatory fines continues 
to be un-recoverable. As for the future, the occasional handing over of a few 
scapegoats – those unfortunates for whom deniability is least available – is not 
effective in transforming occupational culture or practices within the industry.   
 
6. All levels of staff. If the Commission’s terms of reference are to be met, then any 
individual-focussed measures must be supplemented by a wider strategy, 
engaging with the occupational culture of the whole sector and incentivising all 
levels of banking staff. It is true that focussing action against a small number of 
individuals dovetails with criminal law, thus allowing strong disapproval to be 
shown. However, as made clear in evidence on sanctions submitted to the 
Commission by learned legal experts, criminal law is a rather blunt instrument in 
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this context. Without prejudice to the arguments favouring criminal prosecution, 
too much banging of that drum could detract from the search for wider, forward-
looking and transformational regulatory strategies.  
 
7. Collective self-discipline. What is needed is an approach that facilitates higher 
financial recoveries (economic justice), whilst also transforming the occupational 
culture of the financial services industry (preventative safeguards), by encouraging 
those working in the industry to more closely scrutinise and discipline each other. 
For this, the Commission should consider a form of collective responsibility and 
financial accountability, meriting collective clawbacks in cases of rule-breaking, 
recklessness or other malfeasance.  
 
8. Vertical clawbacks. Financial responsibility and accountability should be extended 
both vertically and horizontally. Vertical clawbacks, extended to those who hold 
line supervisory or management responsibilities, are clearly merited. If superiors 
claim not to have known, then either they neglected their duties, tactically turned a 
blind eye or strategically ensured that they were never formally informed. If there 
is a reason for this logic not to extend to senior compliance officers, legal counsel, 
chief operating officers and indeed board members, let the argument be heard 
(c.f. evidence given by Lord Turner5). 
 
9. Lateral clawbacks – affecting all those within the team, unit and/or bonus pool 
within which malfeasance occurs (for example, a sales team, prop trading desk or 
the department within which it sits) – would have the potential to positively 
incentivise a broader swathe of bank employees to take preventive action. A 
significant (quite high) level of clawback would be appropriate for those working 
alongside or near the locus of undesirable behaviour. In the absence of such an 
incentive, nearby staff might possibly disapprove of the behaviour but shrug it off 
(on the basis that it is not really their business, since they themselves are not 
directly involved and hence would not be held to account); or they might observe 
the behaviour with some amusement or excitement (‘so that’s how it works!’); or 
they might even facilitate it in small ways (carrying out tasks on request).  
 
10. How widely? It could be for consideration whether a more modest level of 
clawback might be applied routinely across all departments and pay grades within 
a bank. On the one hand, such whole-staff accountability might have a broad 
reinforcing effect, in terms of occupational culture. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that staff in different departments, when they are distant from the 
behaviour disapproved of, would have little knowledge of or change to influence 
the behaviour. Nevertheless, such insularity and deniability needs to be reduced, 
encouraging all banks staff to look twice. This is partly a moral question but also 
partly an empirical question, answerable experimentally – by putting into effect 
various accountability regimes and observing their cultural consequences. In any 
case, there can be no argument against accountability for those who are close to 
malfeasance and observe it on an everyday basis. 
 
11. Proportionality and fairness. Arguments against collective responsibility could be 
mounted from the perspectives of fairness and proportionality. In addressing such 
concerns, and it finding a balance, it can be argued that a strategy of collective 
responsibility would be merited on several grounds. Firstly, it could stimulate 
informal and formal controls within the industry, which so far have been noticeably 
absent, dormant or weak. Thus it could have a preventative effect and limit future 
wrong-doing. Secondly, targeting not only the one or few persons most centrally 
involved, but also wider sets of facilitating or knowing persons, would allow higher 
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cost-recovery. Thus banks could recover closer to 100% of the costs of 
compensating wronged market participants and of paying regulatory fines – in 
contrast to past and recent recoveries of much smaller proportions of such costs.  
 
12. Where to start. If the Commission is interested in making changes in bank 
behaviour, culture and remuneration, yet is uncertain over the applicability of such 
changes generally, then the (partly) publically owned banks could be a testing 
ground. An alternative would be to require such reforms selectively, as conditions 
of settlement with regulators, following misbehaviour or negligence by a bank or 
its staff. If empirical work were to find that the changes seemed positive over time 
– considering for example financial results, regulatory compliance and staff 
engagement and morale – then that could provide ammunition for wider change in 
the industry. A more forthright approach would be to go for cultural and 
remuneration changes ‘across the board’ (in both meanings of the phrase). 
 
13. Experimentalist approach. There are two ways in which the above strategy could 
be implemented: direction via legislation (as in the UK and EU debates on 
remuneration), or via codes of practice which the industry might prefer to offer, 
with a ‘comply or explain’ obligation. Either way, since this area of ‘cultural 
engineering’ is in its infancy, some flexibility in conceptions, requirements and 
modes of implementation could be useful in the early stages. What works, in 
which circumstances and why? It would be useful to explore variations in the 
implementation of cultural and remuneration reform in financial services: that 
points to top-down general principles, allowing for variations. If monitoring over 
time finds that some approaches lead to more positive outcomes than others, then 
that could provide ammunition for wider change across the industry (accepting 
that in practice control measures typically provoke mixed reactions).6 
 
14. Academia’s contribution. Until recently, much of what concerns the Parliamentary 
Commission (and policy-makers, regulators, the public more generally) has not 
been at the centre of public enquiry. Economics, the dominant conceptual frame of 
reference in the run-up to the crisis and continuing today, is not well equipped to 
address cultural issues, because of its somewhat dehumanised models of markets 
and its individualistic models of action. Law is sometimes more promising, as 
reflected in expert evidence given to the Commission by learned scholars, 
however the focus on criminal law is something of a millstone. For a more direct 
engagement with the Commission’s terms of reference, some conceptual tools 
and empirical methodologies are found in the social sciences generally and in 
regulatory studies and socio-legal studies in particular. A closer bringing together 
of policy-making and such intellectual and empirical resources would be helpful.   
 
Limitations inherent in individual accountability 
 
15. Professional standards and culture are collective. It follows that focusing 
responsibility, accountability and clawbacks only upon those directly involved – 
and/or upon their immediate supervisors – would not sufficiently address the 
objectives of the Commission, concerning standards, culture, behaviour and risk-
sharing. 
 
16. Several limitations. In particular, focussing action only on a few bank staff – as is 
the current tendency – gives rise not only to lower cost-recoveries (see above) but 
also to further limitations: too narrow a focus in social terms, the danger of 
provoking counter-measures, and the mire (for present purposes) of criminal law. 
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17. Whole organisation issues. An atmosphere of fear can be created, however that 
may do little to create the broader cultural conditions in which the whole staff of a 
bank cooperate, internally and with regulators, to run a clean ship. Occupational 
culture, standards, behaviour and the prospects for self-control, positive influences 
upon colleagues and, when necessary, whistle-blowing are sector-wide and 
whole-firm issues. 
 
18. Danger of stimulating deniability. Ironically, although accountability of supervisory 
and senior management seems morally justifiable, threat of tough action against 
those at the top can be counter-productive. It runs a risk of stimulating greater 
efforts to defend corporate and individual reputations, for example by ensuring 
that one does not know what one does not wish to know. Senior executives (chief 
executives, chief operating officers, corporate counsel, compliance and risk 
managers) may spend more of their time (and more of the bank’s resources) in 
categorising, managing and neutralising legal and reputational threats. 
 
19. Practical limits of criminal law. Criminal prosecution of individuals may face 
difficulties (broadly agreeing with evidence given in the session on 17 January 
2013). This does not imply that criminal prosecutions may not be appropriate, just 
that consideration may be given also to other remedies, preventative means and 
cultural signals.  
 
20. Historical note. Criminal prosecution of senior executives and other prominent 
individuals meets additional problems. We have been here before: consider the 
travails of the Serious Fraud Office. The difficulties may not result from a lack of 
specific offence categories; more generally they have to do with the questions of 
intent and the criminal standard of proof, especially when sophisticated defence 
teams are deployed.  
 
21. Not forgetting civil proceedings. One clear implication in practical (instrumental) 
terms is that civil proceedings have more leverage, even if they lack some of the 
symbolic power and moral opprobrium of criminal law. Whilst public and populist 
anger may be driven by a sense of justice being frustrated and by incredulity over 
excesses in the context of public subsidy for the banks, policy-makers need to 
balance issues of symbolism against consideration of effectiveness.  
 
22. Some harmful behaviour cannot even be civilly proceeded against. Whilst the 
more intrusive regulation that has been provoked by the crisis has helped to bring 
to light evidence of widespread market manipulation and frauds, the wider 
prudential, managerial and risk-management failures that caused the crisis were 
in many cases perfectly legal – the whole industry had an extended Ponzi moment 
(see paragraph 36 onwards). 
 
23. Summary of this section. Prudential considerations demand forms of cultural 
change that cannot be delivered by individual scapegoating, civil proceedings or 
criminal prosecution. However, whole-organisation change could be driven by 
making remuneration a two-way street at organisational level (see paragraphs 4-
12 above). In these terms, and contrary to some submissions made to the 
Commission, it is possible to legislate for cultural change. The conceptual hiving 
off of ‘culture’ from ‘the economy’ and ‘law’ is profoundly unhelpful.   
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Limitations inherent in ‘the tone at the top’ 
 
24. Top down morality? Evidence given to the Commission to some extent reflects the 
contemporary tendency for regulatory bodies to conceptualise culture and 
behaviour in terms of ‘the tone at the top’ of an organisation (inter alia see FSA 
evidence concerning ‘code staff’). On reflection, however, there are limitations to 
any approach that tries to engineer culture from the top downwards. 
Organisational life is not so simple, leaders sometimes dissimulate (visibly) and 
subordinates may respond to a wide variety of signals. Organisational life in 
investment banking, in particular, may be better likened to a collectivity of 
chameleons than to a flight of ducks. 
 
25. Deniability. Those at the theoretical apex of the organisation may know the least 
about what is going on – partly because they are at some distance from the 
everyday lives, conversations, transactions and tactics of their subordinates, and 
partly because they may have a vested interest in not knowing in advance of any 
misdemeanours that might in the short-to-medium term be highly profitable for the 
bank.7  
 
26. Board members. The stance above is even easier position for board members to 
take. That raises the question of what boards are for, however that is outside the 
current enquiry. The point for present purposes is the ‘accountability firewall’. 
 
27. Implication for investigations. As with responsibility, so with regulatory 
investigations: instead of going only ‘up the chain’, interviewing those employees 
who are best-defended in terms of the skills of cloaking, dissimulation and 
misdirection (as police previously used to do in drug trafficking investigations, thus 
often wasting years whilst getting nowhere – ‘the trail peters out’) investigators 
should go both laterally (both within the organisation and without) and also 
downwards, until they encounter persons who are less bound by omertà.  
 
28. Summary of this section. Without wishing to dismiss concerns over ‘the tone at the 
top’, it is fair to observe that ‘the tone in the middle’ and ‘the tone at the bottom’ 
are important. In some respects, more important, since middle and low level 
employees see more and know more (collectively) that the board does. If robustly 
incentivised, middle and level employees are more likely to act to correct abuses, 
either by bringing informal pressure to bear, or by blowing the whistle. At present, 
such incentives are lacking, since some of those working in the financial services 
industry can passively gain from the recklessness and misdemeanours of their 
peers – because they share in the fruits thereof, through group bonuses and/or 
promotion opportunities – whilst not being at any risk of clawbacks unless they are 
also are flagrantly involved. 
 
Engaging with the question of ‘talent’ 
 
29. The talent discourse. Discussions in the Commission and more widely have 
identified an imbalance in the relationship between highly paid employees and the 
organisations that they work for. As has been observed within the Commission, 
the investment bank discourse on ‘talent’ is deployed in such a manner as to push 
up remuneration generally.8 
 
30. Heads I Win, Tails You Lose. Typically, none of these individuals will lose anything 
if things go pear-shaped: they simply won’t gain as much as they had hoped. If 
                                                           Page 
 
Banking culture and collective responsibility, submission to PCBS, from Nicholas Dorn 
 
8
potential gains could be balanced by the prospect of losing significant amounts 
then at least individuals would be incentivised to scrutinise their own behaviours 
and the behaviours of those around them.  
 
31. Group remuneration. For the wider set of colleagues within the same trading 
group as a ‘talented’ trader or executive, the present prospect of sharing in any 
upside – whilst not be effected by any downside – may incentivise such 
colleagues to ‘egg on’ the risk-takers. It certainly does not provide a constraint. 
Culturally speaking and in terms of prudential concerns, this is not helpful.  
 
32. Public subsidy. The above observations call for some explanation of why hitherto 
the talent mechanism – a form of leverage, in effect – might operate so strongly in 
financial services but less so in, say, manufacturing. Part of the answer is to be 
found in the implicit guarantees enjoyed by all but the smallest (or least 
connected) banks. Despite political conditions commonly understood in terms of 
neo-liberalism, exceptional support for banks not only continues today but also 
has been extended. Such subsidy can take several forms: (i) partial state 
ownership, which in the UK was combined with a Treasury strategy that the 
supported entities should be managed far as possible in a manner similar to 
before the crash;9 (ii) asset-buying by central banks, coinciding with conditions in 
which delivering banks lend less and less to the real economy; (iii) ambiguity over 
future bailouts/bail-ins. Continuation of such subsidies works against normalisation 
of the culture of banking, insofar as public insurance for private recklessness 
institutionalises the latter and underpins its claim to talent. 
 
33. Impediments to change. Unfortunately, public and central bank subsidy for 
banking has deep historical roots.10 Best intentions aside, it may be difficult to 
curtail. There are cultural issues here in policy circles, as well as in banking.  
 
34. Distinguishing public ownership from public subsidy of risk. The measures 
advocated in this submission would be equally applicable to publically and 
privately owed banks. Whilst the Treasury seeks to re-privatise all aspects of 
banking, it is an unsettled matter whether long-term public ownership of some 
(utility) elements of banking might be merited on grounds of ensuring common 
infrastructure as a public good. According to political taste, that might be achieved 
through strategic stakes or 100% ownership, at any level of government (EU, 
national, regional or local). But whatever the ownership arrangements, a one-way 
bet on remuneration makes no sense at all. 
 
35. Summary of this section. On the question of what ‘talented people’ deserve, part 
of the answer must be the lack of negative incentive (malus) that might to some 
extent balance positive incentives (salary, bonus, pension arrangements, other 
benefits). If more of a balance – underpinned by the reduction in, if not removal of 
public subsidies – were to result in fewer people declaring themselves to be so 
talented, so conditions in the industry would normalise.  
 
Collective responsibility linked to the challenge of the cycle of boom and bust 
 
36. Beyond ‘rationality’. Historical evidence suggests some limitations of ‘skin in the 
game’ (financial risk-sharing) and also that there may be potential for negative 
consequences as well as positive. Consider the point made in the Commission 
that “Some of the banks that collapsed at the time of the crisis had some of the 
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biggest shareholdings by executives and people who worked in the bank and that 
did not stop them taking those risks”. That is certainly true.  
 
37. The importance of context. This draws our attention to wider settings in which 
incentives are experienced – ‘exogenous factors’, as described during some of the 
evidence given to the Commission (although of course the behaviour of the banks 
help to construct those factors, which therefore are as much endogenous as 
exogenous). As economists and sociologists of diverse political stripes have 
pointed out,11 as any market peaks, even experienced participants who have their 
own funds at risk are reluctant to exit, meanwhile naive late-comers and 
wannabes (including would-be ‘star traders’) hurry to join the party. 
 
38. Boom/bust. Since governance arrangements should, ideally, be fit for all stages of 
capitalism’s inherent boom/bust (rapture/despair) cycle, it is worthwhile to think 
through these issues. Here summarised is Joseph Schumpeter’s three stages of 
slow initial development of a new market, followed by tulip-like mania (think 
subprime) and a fall into recession. 
 
  First, innovators and entrepreneurs – Schumpeter’s heroes – propose new 
ideas to investors and the best ideas (in the eyes of the investors) are funded. 
This investment leads to a general expansion of the economy, as jobs are 
created in supplier firms, employees have more money to spend, they put 
aside some savings (part of which circulate to become available to support 
new investments) and so on. In this phase, the financial sector is seen by 
Schumpeter as playing a valuable role: it supports the ‘real’ economy (the 
latter really having that characteristic at that stage). 
 
  Second, the moment of danger arrives, as entrepreneurs and investors 
chase each other and, in a general atmosphere of overconfidence, make 
indiscriminative investments. As Leathers and Raines (2004, pp 672-3, see 
notes below) put it, writing just after the bursting of the ‘tech bubble’ in 2001 
but before the onset of the present crisis, “pure financial speculation occurs 
and may intensify into a speculative mania”. In this phase, people get carried 
along, taking up debts that will become burdensome in any downturn. The 
finance sector, or large parts of it, feels unable to stand back when things are 
going so swimmingly: in the familiar and hackneyed words of a previous 
chairman of the financial conglomerate Citigroup, Chuck Prince: “When the 
music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But, as long as the 
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”.  
 
  Third, the dénouement duly arrives, as many investments fail to pay off, 
causing losses that banks and other investors compensate for by withdrawing 
or withholding credit from other, economically marginal firms – whereupon 
failures multiply and ‘creative destruction’ clears the decks for a resumption of 
the cycle. What happens then depends in part on policy. Schumpeter believed 
in a hands-off policy, allowing the decks to be cleared and new initiatives to 
emerge (‘creative destruction’ clearing the way for the next upswing).12 
 
39. Possible implications: counter-cyclical cultural/clawback arrangements. The 
question is, to what extent is the above cycle-tendency hard-wired into the 
collective psyche in capitalist societies? If it is very strongly entrenched, then no 
amount of fluffing about governance, standards and culture would be worth the 
paper it is written upon. If, on the other hand, that tendency exists but is open to 
some extent to countervailing influences, then policy should seek to institutionalise 
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such tendencies within occupational cultures (thus paralleling attempts to make 
bank capital provisioning counter-cyclical). There could be quite an agenda here. 
 
40. Optimal conditions. In what used to be called ‘normal’ times – i.e. in between 
boom (collective rapture) and bust (collective fear) – having one’s own funds at 
risk might be expected to induce good judgment and reasonable caution, since the 
lack of excitement one way or the other enables one calmly to weigh up pros and 
cons. This seems a reasonable proposition, subject to empirical test. 
 
41. Taking away the punchbowl. At the height of the boom, in conditions of 
generalised over-optimism, wide sections of society get carried away – house-
buyers, mortgage-packagers, ratings agencies, investors, banks, regulators and 
policy-makers. It is difficult at such times for anyone, be they policy-maker, 
regulator or bank board, to ‘take away the punchbowl’. In such a context, it might 
also prove difficult for bank employees to collectively discipline themselves, even if 
the measures advocated in this submission were to be in place. We don’t know, 
because we did not have such arrangements in place prior to the crisis beginning 
in 2007. This could however be a matter for empirical test for the future.  
 
42. Flexibility. In manifest downturns – such as the present time – having even a very 
small proportion of one’s remuneration at risk may risk paralysis. Thus there may 
be a case for clawbacks, collective and otherwise, to be tapered to fit the times. 
 
43. Summary of this section. The analytical and policy bottom line is that further 
thought needs to be given to possible interactions between the broader setting 
(including the waxing and waning of sentiment with the business cycle) and 




1 Erasmus School of Law (ESL) is a constituent part of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands. ESL locates law in its economic and social context: http://www.esl.eur.nl/home  
 
2 This submission draws upon drafts of a book in preparation: Democracy and Diversity in 
Financial Market Regulation. It also draws upon the following: ‘Knowing markets: would less 
be more?’ Economy and Society, volume 41(3), pp 316-334. ‘Regulatory sloth and activism in 
the effervescence of financial crisis’, Law & Policy, volume 33(3), pp 428-448. ‘Render Unto 
Caesar: EU financial market regulation meets political accountability’, Journal of European 
Integration, 34(3), pp 205-221. ‘Policy choices in financial market regulation: market rapture, 
club rules or democracy?’, chapter 2 in Alexander, K and Moloney, N (eds), Law Reform and 
Financial Markets, Cheltenham: Elgar, chapter summary at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1946373. 
 
3 The scandals come so thick, fast and loudly that they hardly need documenting here, 
although there remain many questions over the efficacy of responses. See for example, ‘The 
metamorphosis of insider trading in the face of regulatory enforcement’, Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, 19(1), pp 75-84. ‘The Governance of Securities: Ponzi finance, 
regulatory convergence, credit crunch’, British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), pp 23-45. 
‘Theorising the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2010 Settlement with Goldman Sachs: 
legislative weakness, reintegrative shaming or temporary business interruption for financial 
market power elites?’, with Levi, M, in Antonopoulos, G et al (eds), Usual and Unusual 
Organising Criminals in Europe, Antwerp: Maklu, abstract at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788885. 
 
4 As reported in Jenkins, P, ‘Time to rehabilitate bankers’ bonuses’, Financial Times, 4 March 
2013. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5867ba0e-84d2-11e2-aaf1-00144feabdc0.html  
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5 Evidence 27 February 2013, Lord Turner’s answer to Q4495. 
 
6 In my opinion the purpose of monitoring the implementation of cultural reform should be to 
get a sense of the emergence amonst bank staff of what, quite likely, would be a variety of 
responses and coping reactions. The three standard research response-categories to be found 
throughout the literatures on communication studies, cultural studies and regulatory 
compliance are as follows. 
(a) Shades of agreement and acquiescence, enthusiastic or otherwise, so more or less 
complying with the letter if not always the spirit of the reforms (bearing in mind however 
that compliance sometimes has unanticipated consequences, which need to be looked 
for). 
(b) Negotiated and innovative responses, including creative re-castings of the meanings and 
requirements of the reforms; and/or creating new or exploiting existing non-monitored 
channels, networks or pools (cultural equivalents of offshore trading or off balance sheet 
vehicles). 
(c) Outright opposition, i.e. resistance and sabotage using all the resources of firms, legal and 
other advisors, trade associations and lobbyists – or possibly resistance by certain 
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